Strategyproof facility location in perturbation stable instances
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Publication:2152106
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6381735 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5343725 (Why is no real title available?)
- Algorithms for stable and perturbation-resilient problems
- Beyond the Worst-Case Analysis of Algorithms
- Center-based clustering under perturbation stability
- Clustering under approximation stability
- Combinatorial auctions via posted prices
- Facility location games with optional preference
- Heterogeneous facility location without money
- Locating libraries on a street
- Mechanism design for constrained heterogeneous facility location
- On the power of deterministic mechanisms for facility location games
- On the practically interesting instances of MAXCUT
- Prophet inequalities made easy: stochastic optimization by pricing nonstochastic inputs
- Strategy-proof mechanisms for facility location games with many facilities
- Strategyproof approximation of the minimax on networks
- Strategyproof facility location for concave cost functions
- Strategyproof facility location for three agents on a circle
- The power of verification for one-parameter agents
- Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness
- Truthfulness flooded domains and the power of verification for mechanism design
- Winner-imposing strategyproof mechanisms for multiple facility location games
- \(k\)-center clustering under perturbation resilience
Cited in
(4)- Approximately Optimal Mechanisms for Strategyproof Facility Location: Minimizing Lp Norm of Costs
- On the power of static assignment policies for robust facility location problems
- Optimality of the coordinate-wise median mechanism for strategyproof facility location in two dimensions
- Nearly complete characterization of 2-agent deterministic strategyproof mechanisms for single facility location in \(L_p\) space
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