Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices

DOI10.1137/1.9781611973730.10zbMath1372.91049arXiv1411.4916OpenAlexW2950351404MaRDI QIDQ5363025

Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, N. V. Gravin

Publication date: 5 October 2017

Published in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1411.4916

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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