scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7204414
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5111298
DOI10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2017.80zbMath1443.91164arXiv1602.08719MaRDI QIDQ5111298
Peter Bro Miltersen, Simina Brânzei, Yulong Zeng, Aris Filos-Ratsikas
Publication date: 26 May 2020
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1602.08719
Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Related Items (5)
Walrasian pricing in multi-unit auctions ⋮ Simple combinatorial auctions with budget constraints ⋮ On envy-free revenue approximation for combinatorial buyers with budgets ⋮ On fair price discrimination in multi-unit markets ⋮ On social envy-freeness in multi-unit markets
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
- Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
- Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts
- Selling multiple correlated goods: revenue maximization and menu-size complexity
- Envy-Free Revenue Approximation for Asymmetric Buyers with Budgets
- Revenue Maximizing Envy-Free Fixed-Price Auctions with Budgets
- To Save Or Not To Save: The Fisher Game
- Verifiably Truthful Mechanisms
- How Profitable Are Strategic Behaviors in a Market?
- Optimal Auction Design
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets
- Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Auctions
- Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices
- Algorithmic Game Theory
- Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizations
This page was built for publication:
