Pricing multi-unit markets

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_10MaRDI QIDQ2190388zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden, Warut Suksompong

Publication date 18 June 2020

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.06623

zbMATH Keywords

multi-unit marketsoptimal social welfareuniform and non-uniform prices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Welfare economics (91B15) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Abstract: We study the power and limitations of posted prices in multi-unit markets, where agents arrive sequentially in an arbitrary order. We prove upper and lower bounds on the largest fraction of the optimal social welfare that can be guaranteed with posted prices, under a range of assumptions about the designer's information and agents' valuations. Our results provide insights about the relative power of uniform and non-uniform prices, the relative difficulty of different valuation classes, and the implications of different informational assumptions. Among other results, we prove constant-factor guarantees for agents with (symmetric) subadditive valuations, even in an incomplete-information setting and with uniform prices.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(15)

• Market pricing for matroid rank valuations
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7204414 (Why is no real title available?)
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• On fair price discrimination in multi-unit markets
• Simultaneous 2nd price item auctions with no-underbidding
• Iterative Price Mechanisms
• Pricing online decisions: beyond auctions
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• Multi-buyer discount pricing
• Elicitation using multiple price list formats
• A Dual Approach for Dynamic Pricing in Multidemand Markets
• Max-min greedy matching problem: hardness for the adversary and fractional variant
• Multiple markets: new perspective on nonlinear pricing
• Pricing to maximize revenue and welfare simultaneously in large markets

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