Pricing multi-unit markets
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Publication:2190388
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_10zbMATH Open1443.91160arXiv1705.06623OpenAlexW2796247415MaRDI QIDQ2190388FDOQ2190388
Authors: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden, Warut Suksompong 
Publication date: 18 June 2020
Abstract: We study the power and limitations of posted prices in multi-unit markets, where agents arrive sequentially in an arbitrary order. We prove upper and lower bounds on the largest fraction of the optimal social welfare that can be guaranteed with posted prices, under a range of assumptions about the designer's information and agents' valuations. Our results provide insights about the relative power of uniform and non-uniform prices, the relative difficulty of different valuation classes, and the implications of different informational assumptions. Among other results, we prove constant-factor guarantees for agents with (symmetric) subadditive valuations, even in an incomplete-information setting and with uniform prices.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.06623
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Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Welfare economics (91B15) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Cites Work
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Cited In (14)
- Market pricing for matroid rank valuations
- Static pricing for multi-unit prophet inequalities
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Simultaneous 2nd price item auctions with no-underbidding
- On fair price discrimination in multi-unit markets
- Pricing online decisions: beyond auctions
- Iterative Price Mechanisms
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- Multi-buyer discount pricing
- A Dual Approach for Dynamic Pricing in Multidemand Markets
- Elicitation using multiple price list formats
- Max-min greedy matching problem: hardness for the adversary and fractional variant
- Multiple markets: new perspective on nonlinear pricing
- Pricing to maximize revenue and welfare simultaneously in large markets
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