Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing
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Publication:4715545
DOI10.2307/2171924zbMath0861.90015OpenAlexW2007271887MaRDI QIDQ4715545
Publication date: 18 November 1996
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2171924
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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