On the optimality of pure bundling for a monopolist
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Publication:745001
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.011zbMath1368.91104OpenAlexW2111906371MaRDI QIDQ745001
Sjaak Hurkens, Domenico Menicucci, Doh-Shin Jeon
Publication date: 12 October 2015
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/18398/1/Menicucci_18398.pdf
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (7)
Selling two identical objects ⋮ Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items ⋮ Optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations ⋮ Pricing Strategies of Unbundling and Mixed-Bundling in a Two-Sided Market Under Stochastic Demand ⋮ Optimal mechanisms with simple menus ⋮ Dominant firm and competitive bundling in oligopoly markets ⋮ Selling multiple correlated goods: revenue maximization and menu-size complexity
Cites Work
- Optimal mechanisms with simple menus
- Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly. A corrigendum
- Approximating optimization problems over convex functions
- A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
- Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
- Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
- Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
- Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
- Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations
- Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing
- On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items
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