Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
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Publication:2469842
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.12.007zbMath1132.91435OpenAlexW3125075993MaRDI QIDQ2469842
Alejandro M. Manelli, Daniel R. Vincent
Publication date: 11 February 2008
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74262
extreme pointadverse selectionmechanism designfacesincentive compatibilitymonopoly pricingmultidimensional screeningnon-linear pricing
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