Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
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Publication:1676468
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2017.09.001zbMath1414.91151arXiv1204.1846OpenAlexW2963249463MaRDI QIDQ1676468
Publication date: 7 November 2017
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.1846
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