Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions

DOI10.2307/1913096zbMath0661.90104OpenAlexW2067758411MaRDI QIDQ3812075

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/55b332c19d7a2b44e43e7c2674302addb973350c

zbMATH Keywords

optimal design Bayesian Nash equilibria information structures auction games dominant bidding strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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