Fully-revealing equilibria of multiple-sender signaling and screening models

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0091-5zbMath1102.91022OpenAlexW2166565326MaRDI QIDQ2432514

Adam Meirowitz, David P. Baron

Publication date: 25 October 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0091-5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (4)

Mechanism design goes to war: Peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types ⋮ Communication and bargaining in the spatial model ⋮ Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework ⋮ The limited value of a second opinion: competition and exaggeration in experimental cheap talk games

Cites Work

• Implementation in differential information economies
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• Probability

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