Implementation in differential information economies

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Publication:1079461

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(86)90018-9zbMath0597.90010OpenAlexW2045214143MaRDI QIDQ1079461

David Schmeidler, Andrew Postlewaite

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90018-9




Related Items (72)

Implementation in differential information economiesPrivate information in large economiesFinancial fragility and over-the-counter marketsCoalition-proof full efficient implementationSequential rationality, implementation and pre-play communicationPerfect Bayesian implementationContinuous implementation of constrained rational expectations equilibriaAllocation of resources in a divisionalized firmSelf-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectationsVirtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and typesCommunication and bargaining in the spatial modelStopping agents from ``cheatingClosure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementationA full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reductionExistence of equilibrium in Bayesian games with infinitely many playersApproximately competitive equilibria in large finite economiesMultiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementationInformational smallness and the scope for limiting information rentsPrivate disclosure with multiple agentsRobust dynamic implementationRobustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoringBehavioral implementation under incomplete informationFull implementation of social choice functions in dominant strategiesMixed Bayesian implementation in general environmentsEgalitarian equivalence under asymmetric informationRobust implementation in general mechanismsInformational size and the incentive compatible coarse core in quasilinear economiesFeasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowmentsFully-revealing equilibria of multiple-sender signaling and screening modelsInformational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information.Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterizationSimple mechanisms and preferences for honestyQuantum Bayesian implementationInformational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty.Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanismsDominant strategy implementation in economic environmentsEx post implementationEfficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communicationImplementation via backward inductionImplementation TheoryThe efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private informationContinuous implementation in economies with incomplete informationImplementing a public project and distributing its costA dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problemsMechanism design with possibilistic beliefsBayesian implementation with verifiable informationBayesian incentive compatible parametrization of mechanismsIRRATIONALITY‐PROOFNESS: MARKETS VERSUS GAMESA note on the incentive compatible coreStrategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian gamesRobust and secure implementation: equivalence theoremsA characterization of virtual Bayesian implementationTreading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individualsBayesian implementation with partially honest individualsMechanism design with partial state verifiabilityAggregation of expert opinionsMonopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economiesImplementation of Walrasian expectations equilibriaFeasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible setsExtensive form implementation in incomplete information environmentsWeak implementationEfficiency in correlated equilibriumIncomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the coreImplementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage gamesInteractive implementationPivotal players and the characterization of influenceImplementation in principal-agent models of adverse selectionIncomplete information, credibility and the coreImplementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed plannersIncentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.Informational smallness in rational expectations equilibria.Two-period economies with price-contingent deliveries



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