Implementation in differential information economies

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(86)90018-9zbMATH Open0597.90010OpenAlexW2045214143MaRDI QIDQ1079461FDOQ1079461

Authors: Andrew Postlewaite, David Schmeidler 

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90018-9

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zbMATH Keywords

differential information economiesimplementation of social choice correspondences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
• Agreeing to disagree
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Approximate Efficiency of Non-Walrasian Nash Equilibria
• Implementation in differential information economies
• On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
• Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
• A modified version of Arrow's IIA condition

Cited In (93)

• Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments
• Coalition-proof full efficient implementation
• IRRATIONALITY‐PROOFNESS: MARKETS VERSUS GAMES
• Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners
• Implementation and orderings of public information
• Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation
• Behavioral implementation under incomplete information
• A network solution to robust implementation: the case of identical but unknown distributions
• A more credible approach to parallel trends
• A welfare analysis of occupational licensing in U.S. states
• Hazed and confused: the effect of air pollution on dementia
• IQ, expectations, and choice
• Optimal feedback in contests
• Save, spend, or give? A model of housing, family insurance, and savings in old age
• Stratification trees for adaptive randomisation in randomised controlled trials
• Testing the production approach to markup estimation
• Unemployment insurance in macroeconomic stabilization
• Implementation Theory
• Implementation with unknown endowments in a two-trader pure exchange economy
• Bayesian implementation with verifiable information
• Weak implementation
• Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
• Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments
• Credible implementation
• Aggregation of expert opinions
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
• Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty.
• Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
• Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information
• Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games
• Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments
• Informational smallness in rational expectations equilibria.
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
• Money and storage in a differential information economy
• Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations
• Efficiency in correlated equilibrium
• Monopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economies
• Existence of equilibrium in Bayesian games with infinitely many players
• Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
• Robust implementation in general mechanisms
• Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
• Ex post implementation
• Financial fragility and over-the-counter markets
• Approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies
• Two-period economies with price-contingent deliveries
• Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
• Communication and bargaining in the spatial model
• Allocation of resources in a divisionalized firm
• Quantum Bayesian implementation
• Full implementation of social choice functions in dominant strategies
• Continuous implementation of constrained rational expectations equilibria
• Interactive implementation
• Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
• On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential information economies
• Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
• Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents
• Fully-revealing equilibria of multiple-sender signaling and screening models
• Stopping agents from ``cheating
• Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
• Private disclosure with multiple agents
• Implementation of Walrasian expectations equilibria
• Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games
• Private information in large economies
• Informational size and the incentive compatible coarse core in quasilinear economies
• The efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information
• Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
• Sequential rationality, implementation and pre-play communication
• Continuous implementation in economies with incomplete information
• Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs
• Incomplete information, credibility and the core
• Robust dynamic implementation
• Implementation via backward induction
• Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets
• Pivotal players and the characterization of influence
• Bayesian incentive compatible parametrization of mechanisms
• A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
• Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information.
• Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Perfect Bayesian implementation
• A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
• Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication
• Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
• On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential information economies
• Robust and secure implementation: equivalence theorems
• A note on the incentive compatible core
• Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
• Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
• Differential information economies
• Implementation in differential information economies
• A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems

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