Implementation in differential information economies
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Cites work
- A modified version of Arrow's IIA condition
- Agreeing to disagree
- Approximate Efficiency of Non-Walrasian Nash Equilibria
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
- Implementation in differential information economies
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
- Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
Cited in
(93)- Credible implementation
- Aggregation of expert opinions
- Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2204545 (Why is no real title available?)
- Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
- Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty.
- Implementation theory
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
- Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information
- Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games
- Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments
- Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
- Informational smallness in rational expectations equilibria.
- Coalition-proof full efficient implementation
- Money and storage in a differential information economy
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2072557 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners
- Efficiency in correlated equilibrium
- Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations
- Existence of equilibrium in Bayesian games with infinitely many players
- Monopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economies
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- Robust implementation in general mechanisms
- Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
- Ex post implementation
- Approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies
- Financial fragility and over-the-counter markets
- Two-period economies with price-contingent deliveries
- Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
- Communication and bargaining in the spatial model
- Allocation of resources in a divisionalized firm
- Quantum Bayesian implementation
- Interactive implementation
- Full implementation of social choice functions in dominant strategies
- Continuous implementation of constrained rational expectations equilibria
- Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
- Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
- Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents
- On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential information economies
- Fully-revealing equilibria of multiple-sender signaling and screening models
- Implementation and orderings of public information
- Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
- Stopping agents from ``cheating
- Irrationality-proofness: markets versus games
- Implementation of Walrasian expectations equilibria
- Private disclosure with multiple agents
- Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games
- Private information in large economies
- Informational size and the incentive compatible coarse core in quasilinear economies
- Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
- The efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information
- Continuous implementation in economies with incomplete information
- Sequential rationality, implementation and pre-play communication
- Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs
- Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation
- Robust dynamic implementation
- Incomplete information, credibility and the core
- Implementation via backward induction
- Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets
- Pivotal players and the characterization of influence
- Behavioral implementation under incomplete information
- Bayesian incentive compatible parametrization of mechanisms
- A network solution to robust implementation: the case of identical but unknown distributions
- A more credible approach to parallel trends
- A welfare analysis of occupational licensing in U.S. states
- Hazed and confused: the effect of air pollution on dementia
- IQ, expectations, and choice
- Optimal feedback in contests
- Save, spend, or give? A model of housing, family insurance, and savings in old age
- Stratification trees for adaptive randomisation in randomised controlled trials
- Testing the production approach to markup estimation
- Unemployment insurance in macroeconomic stabilization
- Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information.
- A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
- Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies
- Perfect Bayesian implementation
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5050006 (Why is no real title available?)
- A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
- Bayesian implementation with verifiable information
- Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication
- Implementation with unknown endowments in a two-trader pure exchange economy
- Weak implementation
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
- Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
- On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential information economies
- Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
- Robust and secure implementation: equivalence theorems
- Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
- A note on the incentive compatible core
- Differential information economies
- Implementation in differential information economies
- Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments
- A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems
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