Implementation in differential information economies
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Publication:1079461
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(86)90018-9zbMath0597.90010OpenAlexW2045214143MaRDI QIDQ1079461
David Schmeidler, Andrew Postlewaite
Publication date: 1986
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90018-9
Related Items (72)
Implementation in differential information economies ⋮ Private information in large economies ⋮ Financial fragility and over-the-counter markets ⋮ Coalition-proof full efficient implementation ⋮ Sequential rationality, implementation and pre-play communication ⋮ Perfect Bayesian implementation ⋮ Continuous implementation of constrained rational expectations equilibria ⋮ Allocation of resources in a divisionalized firm ⋮ Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations ⋮ Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types ⋮ Communication and bargaining in the spatial model ⋮ Stopping agents from ``cheating ⋮ Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation ⋮ A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction ⋮ Existence of equilibrium in Bayesian games with infinitely many players ⋮ Approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies ⋮ Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation ⋮ Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents ⋮ Private disclosure with multiple agents ⋮ Robust dynamic implementation ⋮ Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring ⋮ Behavioral implementation under incomplete information ⋮ Full implementation of social choice functions in dominant strategies ⋮ Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments ⋮ Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information ⋮ Robust implementation in general mechanisms ⋮ Informational size and the incentive compatible coarse core in quasilinear economies ⋮ Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments ⋮ Fully-revealing equilibria of multiple-sender signaling and screening models ⋮ Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information. ⋮ Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization ⋮ Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty ⋮ Quantum Bayesian implementation ⋮ Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty. ⋮ Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms ⋮ Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments ⋮ Ex post implementation ⋮ Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication ⋮ Implementation via backward induction ⋮ Implementation Theory ⋮ The efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information ⋮ Continuous implementation in economies with incomplete information ⋮ Implementing a public project and distributing its cost ⋮ A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems ⋮ Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs ⋮ Bayesian implementation with verifiable information ⋮ Bayesian incentive compatible parametrization of mechanisms ⋮ IRRATIONALITY‐PROOFNESS: MARKETS VERSUS GAMES ⋮ A note on the incentive compatible core ⋮ Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games ⋮ Robust and secure implementation: equivalence theorems ⋮ A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation ⋮ Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals ⋮ Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Mechanism design with partial state verifiability ⋮ Aggregation of expert opinions ⋮ Monopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economies ⋮ Implementation of Walrasian expectations equilibria ⋮ Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets ⋮ Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments ⋮ Weak implementation ⋮ Efficiency in correlated equilibrium ⋮ Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core ⋮ Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games ⋮ Interactive implementation ⋮ Pivotal players and the characterization of influence ⋮ Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection ⋮ Incomplete information, credibility and the core ⋮ Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners ⋮ Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey. ⋮ Informational smallness in rational expectations equilibria. ⋮ Two-period economies with price-contingent deliveries
Cites Work
- Implementation in differential information economies
- Agreeing to disagree
- A modified version of Arrow's IIA condition
- On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
- Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Approximate Efficiency of Non-Walrasian Nash Equilibria
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
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