Ex post implementation
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Publication:932807
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.006zbMath1142.91434OpenAlexW3023268692MaRDI QIDQ932807
Publication date: 11 July 2008
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.006
Related Items (17)
Incentives and justice for sequencing problems ⋮ Information acquisition and full surplus extraction ⋮ On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions ⋮ An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values ⋮ Behavioral implementation under incomplete information ⋮ Implementation with a sympathizer ⋮ Double implementation in dominant strategy equilibria and ex-post equilibria with private values ⋮ Two-person ex post implementation ⋮ An alternative equivalent formulation for robust implementation ⋮ Algorithms and mechanisms for procuring services with uncertain durations using redundancy ⋮ Robust implementation in general mechanisms ⋮ Ex post Nash equilibrium in linear Bayesian games for decision making in multi-environments ⋮ A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment ⋮ Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies ⋮ Incentive compatible market design with applications ⋮ Implementation with evidence ⋮ Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions
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