Ex post implementation

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.006zbMath1142.91434MaRDI QIDQ932807

B. E. Eshmatov

Publication date: 11 July 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.006

zbMATH Keywords

implementation; interdependent values; ex post equilibrium; single crossing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

Implementation with evidence, Two-person ex post implementation, Algorithms and mechanisms for procuring services with uncertain durations using redundancy, Incentive compatible market design with applications, Information acquisition and full surplus extraction, Robust implementation in general mechanisms, On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions, An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values, Ex post Nash equilibrium in linear Bayesian games for decision making in multi-environments, Incentives and justice for sequencing problems, A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment

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