Double implementation in dominant strategy equilibria and ex-post equilibria with private values
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Cites work
- Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Ex post implementation
- Implementation in Dominant Strategies under Complete and Incomplete Information
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- On cores and indivisibility
- Robust Mechanism Design
- School choice: an experimental study
- Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
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