Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria

DOI10.1007/S003550050077MaRDI QIDQ1360949zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sang-Chul Suh

Publication date 23 July 1997

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050077

zbMATH Keywords

implementation problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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• Double implementation by a simple game form in the commons problem
• A solution to the problem of consumption externalities.
• Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
• Double implementation in Nash and \(M\)-Nash equilibria
• Robust coalitional implementation
• Double implementation without no-veto-power
• Stable coalition governments: the case of three political parties
• Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules
• An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
• Double implementation in dominant strategy equilibria and ex-post equilibria with private values
• Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations

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