A solution to the problem of consumption externalities.

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(02)00079-4MaRDI QIDQ1415908zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Guoqiang Tian

Publication date 9 December 2003

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(02)00079-4

zbMATH Keywords

ImplementationMechanism designConsumption externalitiesDistributive Lindahl equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4005929 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3709875 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3307201 (Why is no real title available?)
• Coalition-proof implementation
• Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension
• Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
• Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria
• Double implementation in economies with production technologies unknown to the designer
• Double implementation of Lindahl allocations by a pure mechanism
• Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism
• Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence without continuous, convex, and ordered preferences
• Incentive mechanism design for production economies with both private and public ownerships
• Nash-Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence with Decreasing Returns to Scale Technologies
• On the informational size of message spaces
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions

Cited in

(8)

• Mechanism design for a solution to the tragedy of commons
• Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations
• A solution of the externality problem using strategic matching
• Externalities do not necessarily require larger message spaces for realizing Pareto-efficient allocations
• Sufficient conditions for a ``simple decentralization with consumption externalities
• Computing the strong Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games
• Computing the strong \(L_p\)-Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games: convergence and uniqueness
• Theory of negative consumption externalities with applications to the economics of happiness

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