scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3709875
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Publication:3901249
zbMATH Open0453.90007MaRDI QIDQ3901249FDOQ3901249
Authors: Eric Maskin 
Publication date: 1979
Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)
implementationstrong Nash equilibriumsocial choice correspondenceimplementable SCCindividually rational SCCstrongly monotonic function
Cited In (30)
- Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy
- Implementing action profiles when agents collude
- A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation
- Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
- Structural instability of the core
- Coalition formation in games of fair division
- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies
- Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
- A characterization of possibility domains in strategic voting
- Nash implementation and double implementation: Equivalence theorems
- A solution to the problem of consumption externalities.
- Some strategic properties of plurality and majority voting
- Behavioral strong implementation
- Negotiating team formation using deep reinforcement learning
- Implementable social choice rules. Characterization and correspondence theorems under strong Nash equilibrium
- The insider's curse
- An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
- A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
- On the individual and coalitional manipulability of \(q\)-Paretian social choice rules
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications
- Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions
- An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability
- A unified framework for implementation and the revelation principle
- Weakly implementable social choice rules
- Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions
- Double implementation in Nash and \(M\)-Nash equilibria
- Power structure and cardinality restrictions for Paretian social choice rules
- Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions
- Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
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