scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3709875

Cited in

(30)

Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy
Implementing action profiles when agents collude
A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation
Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
Structural instability of the core
Coalition formation in games of fair division
Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies
Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
A characterization of possibility domains in strategic voting
Nash implementation and double implementation: Equivalence theorems
A solution to the problem of consumption externalities.
Some strategic properties of plurality and majority voting
Behavioral strong implementation
Negotiating team formation using deep reinforcement learning
Implementable social choice rules. Characterization and correspondence theorems under strong Nash equilibrium
The insider's curse
A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
On the individual and coalitional manipulability of \(q\)-Paretian social choice rules
Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications
Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions
An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability
A unified framework for implementation and the revelation principle
Weakly implementable social choice rules
Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions
Power structure and cardinality restrictions for Paretian social choice rules
Double implementation in Nash and \(M\)-Nash equilibria
Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions
Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization

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