scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3709875

Cited in

(31)

Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions
Structural instability of the core
Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications
Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions
Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions
Some strategic properties of plurality and majority voting
Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
Implementable social choice rules. Characterization and correspondence theorems under strong Nash equilibrium
Weakly implementable social choice rules
Nash implementation and double implementation: Equivalence theorems
Coalition formation in games of fair division
A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
A unified framework for implementation and the revelation principle
Implementing action profiles when agents collude
Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
A solution to the problem of consumption externalities.
Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy
An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability
Double implementation in Nash and \(M\)-Nash equilibria
Negotiating team formation using deep reinforcement learning
A characterization of possibility domains in strategic voting
Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies
Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation
Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
Behavioral strong implementation
The insider's curse
On the individual and coalitional manipulability of \(q\)-Paretian social choice rules
Strong Nash implementation and economic applications
Power structure and cardinality restrictions for Paretian social choice rules

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