Recommendations
- Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies
- Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
- Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
- Collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification yielding optimal solutions
- Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3709875 (Why is no real title available?)
- Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
- Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
- Incentives in Teams
- Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
- Manipulation through bribes
- On Coalition Incentive Compatibility
- On the constancy of bribe-proof solutions
- Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
- Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency
- Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- Virtual implementation in backwards induction
Cited in
(14)- Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains
- Telling the other what one knows? Strategic lying in a modified acquiring-a-company experiment with two-sided private information
- Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
- Adversarial behavior in network games
- Fault tolerance in large games
- Coalition-proof full efficient implementation
- Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies
- Robust coalitional implementation
- Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
- Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions
- Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
- Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction
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