Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
From MaRDI portal
Publication:417640
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.021zbMath1258.91083MaRDI QIDQ417640
Publication date: 14 May 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.021
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
Related Items
Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions, Coalition-proof full efficient implementation, Fault tolerance in large games, Adversarial behavior in network games, Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies, Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains
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