Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.01.021MaRDI QIDQ417640zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jing Chen, Silvio Micali

Publication date 14 May 2012

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.021

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencycollusionVickrey auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies
• Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
• Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
• Collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification yielding optimal solutions
• Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3709875 (Why is no real title available?)
• Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
• Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
• Incentives in Teams
• Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
• Manipulation through bribes
• On Coalition Incentive Compatibility
• On the constancy of bribe-proof solutions
• Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
• Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
• Strategy-Proof Exchange
• Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency
• Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Virtual implementation in backwards induction

Cited in

(14)

• Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains
• Telling the other what one knows? Strategic lying in a modified acquiring-a-company experiment with two-sided private information
• Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations
• Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
• Adversarial behavior in network games
• Fault tolerance in large games
• Coalition-proof full efficient implementation
• Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies
• Robust coalitional implementation
• Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
• Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions
• Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
• Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
• Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction

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