Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
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Publication:417640
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.01.021zbMATH Open1258.91083OpenAlexW2010750538MaRDI QIDQ417640FDOQ417640
Publication date: 14 May 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.021
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
- Manipulation through bribes
- Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
- Incentives in Teams
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
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- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
- Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
- On the constancy of bribe-proof solutions
- Virtual implementation in backwards induction
- Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
- On Coalition Incentive Compatibility
- Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Cited In (11)
- Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction
- Coalition-proof full efficient implementation
- Adversarial behavior in network games
- Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies
- Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions
- Fault tolerance in large games
- Telling the other what one knows? Strategic lying in a modified acquiring-a-company experiment with two-sided private information
- Robust coalitional implementation
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
- Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains
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