On Coalition Incentive Compatibility

DOI10.2307/2297048MaRDI QIDQ3853385zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jerry Green

Publication date 1979

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/16021/1/Laffont_16021.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

coalition incentive compatibilitycoalitionsgame theoretic modelGroves mechanismimpossibility theoremmanipulationmisrepresentationspivotal mechanismseparable utility functionsocial choicesocial decision makingtruthful revelation of preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14)

Cited in

(16)

• Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms in continuum economies. Characterization and existence
• Coalitionally dominant strategy mechanisms with limited public information
• Manipulation through bribes
• Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
• Robust coalitional implementation
• Constrained allocation of projects to heterogeneous workers with preferences over peers
• Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations
• Domain expansion of the pivotal mechanism
• Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies
• Deriving consensus in multiagent systems
• Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
• Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
• Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction
• Transaction fee mechanisms robust to welfare-increasing collusion
• Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions
• On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties

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