On Coalition Incentive Compatibility
DOI10.2307/2297048zbMATH Open0419.90012OpenAlexW2109610577MaRDI QIDQ3853385FDOQ3853385
Authors: Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jerry Green 
Publication date: 1979
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/16021/1/Laffont_16021.pdf
coalitionsgame theoretic modelmanipulationsocial choiceimpossibility theoremGroves mechanismsocial decision makingmisrepresentationspivotal mechanismseparable utility functioncoalition incentive compatibilitytruthful revelation of preferences
Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12) Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
Cited In (15)
- Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations
- Constrained allocation of projects to heterogeneous workers with preferences over peers
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction
- Deriving consensus in multiagent systems
- On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
- Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
- Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies
- Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions
- Manipulation through bribes
- Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms in continuum economies. Characterization and existence
- Coalitionally dominant strategy mechanisms with limited public information
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Robust coalitional implementation
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
- Domain expansion of the pivotal mechanism
This page was built for publication: On Coalition Incentive Compatibility
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3853385)
