Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105074zbMath1452.91073OpenAlexW2900200578MaRDI QIDQ2211471

Colin von Negenborn, Martin Pollrich

Publication date: 11 November 2020

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58112/1/100.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

correlationasymmetric informationmechanism designcollusionrandom incentives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Mechanism design theory (91B03) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Related Items (2)

Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion ⋮ Optimal transparency of monitoring capability

Cites Work

• Mediated contracts and mechanism design
• Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
• Mechanism design with collusive supervision
• Optimal collusion-proof auctions
• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• On monitoring and collusion in hierarchies
• Manipulations by coalitions under asymmetric information: The case of Groves mechanisms
• Consulting collusive experts
• Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information
• Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• On Coalition Incentive Compatibility
• Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
• Collusion and delegation under information control
• Mediated Partnerships
• Collusion in Hierarchical Agency
• Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency

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