A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1093502
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(87)90007-3zbMath0628.90003OpenAlexW1989792334MaRDI QIDQ1093502
Publication date: 1987
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(87)90007-3
Related Items
Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences ⋮ Selling two identical objects ⋮ Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms ⋮ Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity ⋮ A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments ⋮ Optimal bunching without optimal control ⋮ Risk minimization and optimal derivative design in a principal agent game ⋮ Afriat's theorem and Samuelson's `eternal darkness' ⋮ Efficiency versus optimality in procurement ⋮ Optimal partition of a large labor force into working pairs ⋮ Private Capacities in Mechanism Design ⋮ Mechanisms with Monitoring for Truthful RAM Allocation ⋮ On incentive compatibility in dynamic mechanism design with exit option in a Markovian environment ⋮ Rearrangement inequalities in non-convex insurance models ⋮ Revealed preference test and shortest path problem; graph theoretic structure of the rationalizability test ⋮ Reduced cost functions and their applications ⋮ Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments ⋮ The nonparametric approach to applied welfare analysis ⋮ Implementability, Walrasian equilibria, and efficient matchings ⋮ A glimpse into the differential topology and geometry of optimal transport ⋮ General truthfulness characterizations via convex analysis ⋮ On the implementability of contracts without quasilinear utility ⋮ Revealed preference analysis of expected utility maximization under prize-probability trade-offs ⋮ Monotonicity in direct revelation mechanisms ⋮ Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types ⋮ Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification ⋮ Remarks on Afriat's theorem and the Monge-Kantorovich problem ⋮ Latent complementarity in bundles models ⋮ Mechanism design to the budget constrained buyer: a canonical mechanism approach ⋮ Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences ⋮ Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations ⋮ Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces ⋮ Optimal measure transportation with respect to non-traditional costs ⋮ Full implementation of social choice functions in dominant strategies ⋮ Revealed stochastic choice with attributes ⋮ Distribution functions, extremal limits and optimal transport ⋮ Optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations ⋮ On optimal mechanisms in the two-item single-buyer unit-demand setting ⋮ The marginal tariff approach without single-crossing ⋮ Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Items to a Single Buyer Having Uniformly Distributed Valuations ⋮ Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach ⋮ Unrestricted Domain Extensions of Dominant Strategy Implementable Allocation Functions ⋮ Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design ⋮ Dynamic revenue maximization: a continuous time approach ⋮ Mechanisms for scheduling with single-bit private values ⋮ Remarks on the Monge-Kantorovich problem in the discrete setting ⋮ Convex geometry and its applications. Abstracts from the workshop held December 12--18, 2021 (hybrid meeting) ⋮ On the redistributive power of pensions ⋮ Symposium on revealed preference analysis ⋮ A class of multi-marginal \(c\)-cyclically monotone sets with explicit \(c\)-splitting potentials ⋮ A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game ⋮ Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations ⋮ Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer ⋮ Incentive compatibility in non-quasilinear environments ⋮ Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains ⋮ Multi-marginal maximal monotonicity and convex analysis ⋮ Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations ⋮ Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection? ⋮ Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules ⋮ Optimal derivatives design for mean-variance agents under adverse selection ⋮ Imperfect competition in differentiated credit contract markets ⋮ Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design ⋮ Designing multi-period supply contracts in a two-echelon supply chain with asymmetric information ⋮ Weak monotonicity and Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility ⋮ Mechanism Design ⋮ Incentive compatible market design with applications ⋮ Computation as a correlation device ⋮ Local incentive compatibility with transfers ⋮ Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers ⋮ Quasi-linear integrability: addendum ⋮ Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials ⋮ A complete characterization of group-strategyproof mechanisms of cost-sharing ⋮ When is multidimensional screening a convex program? ⋮ Locally robust implementation and its limits ⋮ Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions ⋮ Adverse selection problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition ⋮ Haggling over substitutes ⋮ Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness ⋮ On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem ⋮ Maxmin implementation ⋮ Balanced implementability of sequencing rules ⋮ On the value of repetition for communication games ⋮ Truthful Mechanisms with Implicit Payment Computation ⋮ No truthful mechanism can be better than \(n\) approximate for two natural problems ⋮ Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable ⋮ Two simplified proofs for Roberts' theorem ⋮ Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings ⋮ Alternatives to Truthfulness Are Hard to Recognize ⋮ An optimal auction for capacity constrained bidders: a network perspective ⋮ Costly information acquisition ⋮ On the optimality of pure bundling for a monopolist ⋮ Implementability with contingent contracts ⋮ A Characterization of Combinatorial Demand ⋮ An Adverse Selection Approach to Power Pricing ⋮ Truthful mechanisms for two-range-values variant of unrelated scheduling ⋮ TESTING THE QUANTAL RESPONSE HYPOTHESIS ⋮ A Rockafellar-type theorem for non-traditional costs ⋮ Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles ⋮ Existence in multidimensional screening with general nonlinear preferences ⋮ On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities ⋮ Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models ⋮ Optimal fund menus ⋮ The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions ⋮ Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities ⋮ An algebraic approach to revealed preference ⋮ Detecting profitable deviations ⋮ A condition for the identification of multivariate models with binary instruments ⋮ A general existence result for the principal-agent problem with adverse selection ⋮ Hamiltonian approach to multi-dimensional screening ⋮ Unnamed Item
Cites Work
- The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations
- Monopoly and product quality
- Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
- Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies
- THE EQUIVALENCE IN TWO DIMENSIONS OF THE STRONG AND WEAK AXIOMS OF REVEADED PREFERENCE
- State Constraints in Convex Control Problems of Bolza
