Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3864918 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3670138 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3090557 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3092982 (Why is no real title available?)
- A modular approach to Roberts' theorem
- A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
- An alternative proof for the linear utility representation theorem
- Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach
- Computationally efficient approximation mechanisms
- Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice
- Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials
- Incentives in Teams
- Mechanism design. A linear programming approach.
- Monotonicity and implementability
- Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts
- Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
- Social Choice with Interpersonal Utility Comparisons: A Diagrammatic Introduction
- Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness
- Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
- Two simplified proofs for Roberts' theorem
- Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
- Weak monotonicity and Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility
Cited in
(18)- Fuzzy classification aggregation
- The uniqueness of the pivotal mechanisms without strategy-proofness
- Strategy-proof characterizations of the pivotal mechanisms on restricted domains
- Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains
- Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
- How much data is sufficient to learn high-performing algorithms?
- Efficiency and Budget Balance
- Two simplified proofs for Roberts' theorem
- Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers
- Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments
- A modular approach to Roberts' theorem
- Two-player incentive compatible outcome functions are affine maximizers
- Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts
- Balanced implementability of sequencing rules
- Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
- Roberts' weak welfarism theorem: a minor correction
- Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations
- Spanning tree auctions: a complete characterization
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