Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
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Publication:417702
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.11.005zbMath1279.91063MaRDI QIDQ417702
Publication date: 14 May 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.11.005
91B14: Social choice
Related Items
Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach, Spanning tree auctions: a complete characterization, Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains, Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers, The uniqueness of the pivotal mechanisms without strategy-proofness, Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts, Balanced implementability of sequencing rules, Two-player incentive compatible outcome functions are affine maximizers, Strategy-proof characterizations of the pivotal mechanisms on restricted domains, Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments, Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains, Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations, Efficiency and Budget Balance
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