Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.11.005MaRDI QIDQ417702zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Debasis Mishra, Arunava Sen

Publication date 14 May 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.11.005

zbMATH Keywords

social welfare orderingaffine maximizersdominant strategy mechanism designRoberts' theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Two simplified proofs for Roberts' theorem
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3864918 (Why is no real title available?)
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3092982 (Why is no real title available?)
• A modular approach to Roberts' theorem
• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• An alternative proof for the linear utility representation theorem
• Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach
• Computationally efficient approximation mechanisms
• Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice
• Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials
• Incentives in Teams
• Mechanism design. A linear programming approach.
• Monotonicity and implementability
• Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts
• Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
• Social Choice with Interpersonal Utility Comparisons: A Diagrammatic Introduction
• Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness
• Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
• Two simplified proofs for Roberts' theorem
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
• Weak monotonicity and Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility

Cited in

(16)

• Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts
• Balanced implementability of sequencing rules
• Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
• Roberts' weak welfarism theorem: a minor correction
• Two simplified proofs for Roberts' theorem
• Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
• A modular approach to Roberts' theorem
• Spanning tree auctions: a complete characterization
• Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments
• Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains
• The uniqueness of the pivotal mechanisms without strategy-proofness
• Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers
• Two-player incentive compatible outcome functions are affine maximizers
• Strategy-proof characterizations of the pivotal mechanisms on restricted domains
• Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations
• Efficiency and Budget Balance

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