Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.11.005zbMATH Open1279.91063OpenAlexW2129076851MaRDI QIDQ417702FDOQ417702

Debasis Mishra, Arunava Sen

Publication date: 14 May 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.11.005

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• Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains
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zbMATH Keywords

social welfare orderingaffine maximizersdominant strategy mechanism designRoberts' theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
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• Incentives in Teams
• Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice
• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach
• Social Choice with Interpersonal Utility Comparisons: A Diagrammatic Introduction
• Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials
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• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
• An alternative proof for the linear utility representation theorem
• Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness
• Weak monotonicity and Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility
• Monotonicity and Implementability
• Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts
• Computationally efficient approximation mechanisms
• A Modular Approach to Roberts’ Theorem
• Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
• Two simplified proofs for Roberts' theorem

Cited In (14)

• The uniqueness of the pivotal mechanisms without strategy-proofness
• Strategy-proof characterizations of the pivotal mechanisms on restricted domains
• Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains
• Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
• Efficiency and Budget Balance
• Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers
• Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments
• Two-player incentive compatible outcome functions are affine maximizers
• Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts
• Balanced implementability of sequencing rules
• Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
• Roberts' weak welfarism theorem: a minor correction
• Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations
• Spanning tree auctions: a complete characterization

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