Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
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Publication:3418482
DOI10.1111/J.1468-0262.2006.00695.XzbMATH Open1152.91428OpenAlexW2016245783WikidataQ62016801 ScholiaQ62016801MaRDI QIDQ3418482FDOQ3418482
Shurojit Chatterji, Ron Lavi, Sushil Bikhchandani, Ahuva Mu'alem, Arunava Sen, Noam Nisan
Publication date: 5 February 2007
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/5052/
Recommendations
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- Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria
- Characterizing robust solutions in monotone games
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Cited In (59)
- A note on the impossibility of multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders
- Multidimensional screening after 37 years
- Implementing randomized allocation rules with outcome-contingent transfers
- A proof of the Nisan-Ronen conjecture
- Private Capacities in Mechanism Design
- Algorithmic mechanism design with investment
- Detecting profitable deviations
- Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
- Incentive compatible mulit-unit combinatorial auctions: a primal dual approach
- Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences
- Improved Lower Bounds for Non-utilitarian Truthfulness
- A Characterization of Combinatorial Demand
- Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
- Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
- Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
- Truthful mechanisms for two-range-values variant of unrelated scheduling
- The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions
- Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design
- Incentive compatibility in non-quasilinear environments
- Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
- Efficient allocation of heterogeneous commodities with balanced transfers
- Mechanism Design
- Two simplified proofs for Roberts' theorem
- Implementability with contingent contracts
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The communication cost of selfishness
- Maxmin implementation
- Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
- Characterization of Truthful Mechanisms for One-Dimensional Single Facility Location Game with Payments
- Incentive compatible mechanisms for scheduling two-parameter job agents on parallel identical machines to minimize the weighted number of late jobs
- Incentive compatible market design with applications
- Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments
- Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness
- Efficient combinatorial allocations: individual rationality versus stability
- On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle
- Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials
- Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types
- No truthful mechanism can be better than \(n\) approximate for two natural problems
- Weak monotonicity and Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility
- Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts
- Improved lower bounds for non-utilitarian truthfulness
- Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
- Balanced implementability of sequencing rules
- The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness
- Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer
- Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences
- General truthfulness characterizations via convex analysis
- Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
- Characterizing incentive compatibility for convex valuations
- Truthful mechanisms for selfish routing and two-parameter agents
- On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response
- Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure
- Setting lower bounds on truthfulness
- Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments
- Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences
- Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations
- Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles
- On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities
- Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms for Machine Scheduling.
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