Weak monotonicity and Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility
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Publication:2462292
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2007.01.008zbMATH Open1271.91072OpenAlexW2138637196MaRDI QIDQ2462292FDOQ2462292
Authors: Rudolf Müller, Andres Perea, Sascha Wolf 
Publication date: 30 November 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.008
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Social choice (91B14) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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- Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
- Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
Cited In (15)
- Qualitative analysis of Bayes-Nash equilibrium in weak asymmetric auctions
- Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
- Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
- On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem
- Implementability with contingent contracts
- Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
- Randomized mechanism design for decentralized network scheduling
- Characterization of Truthful Mechanisms for One-Dimensional Single Facility Location Game with Payments
- Implementing randomized allocation rules with outcome-contingent transfers
- Bayesian and weakly robust first best mechanisms: Characterizations
- Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness
- Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms
- General truthfulness characterizations via convex analysis
- Monotonic Maximin: A Robust Stackelberg Solution against Boundedly Rational Followers
- Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments
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