Weak monotonicity and Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility
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Publication:2462292
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.008zbMath1271.91072OpenAlexW2138637196MaRDI QIDQ2462292
Andrés Perea, Sascha Wolf, Rudolf Müller
Publication date: 30 November 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.008
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)
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