Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2516250
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.002zbMath1318.91094MaRDI QIDQ2516250
Azarakhsh Malekian, Robert D. Kleinberg, Jason D. Hartline
Publication date: 12 August 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.002
incentive compatibility; algorithmic mechanism design; Bayesian mechanism design; multi-dimensional preferences
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
68T42: Agent technology and artificial intelligence
Related Items
Worst-Case Mechanism Design via Bayesian Analysis, The Complexity of Contracts, Implementability, Walrasian equilibria, and efficient matchings, On black-box transformations in downward-closed environments, Introduction to the special issue -- Algorithmic game theory -- STOC/FOCS/SODA 2011, Truthful Mechanisms with Implicit Payment Computation, Computer-Aided Verification for Mechanism Design, Black-Box Reductions in Mechanism Design
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