Bayesian incentive compatibility via fractional assignments
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Publication:5365076
zbMATH Open1377.91101MaRDI QIDQ5365076FDOQ5365076
Authors: Xiaohui Bei, Zhiyi Huang 
Publication date: 29 September 2017
Full work available at URL: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2133093
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- An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms
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- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains
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- Black-box reductions in mechanism design
- A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements
- A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design
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- On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
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- Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design
- A truthful mechanism for value-based scheduling in cloud computing
- A heuristic optimization of Bayesian incentive-compatible cake-cutting
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- Bernoulli factories and black-box reductions in mechanism design
- Worst-case mechanism design via Bayesian analysis
- Near-optimal and robust mechanism design for covering problems with correlated players
- Online pricing for multi-type of items
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