Truthful Mechanisms with Implicit Payment Computation
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Publication:2796397
DOI10.1145/2724705zbMath1333.91013arXiv1004.3630OpenAlexW2199516650MaRDI QIDQ2796397
Moshe Babaioff, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Robert D. Kleinberg
Publication date: 24 March 2016
Published in: Journal of the ACM (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1004.3630
regretalgorithmic mechanism designmulti-armed banditsmultiparameter mechanismssingle-parameter mechanisms
Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Stopping times; optimal stopping problems; gambling theory (60G40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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