An optimal bidimensional multi-armed bandit auction for multi-unit procurement
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Publication:1714944
DOI10.1007/s10472-018-9611-0zbMath1419.91311arXiv1502.06934OpenAlexW3138528045WikidataQ128639465 ScholiaQ128639465MaRDI QIDQ1714944
Satyanath Bhat, Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Yadati Narahari
Publication date: 1 February 2019
Published in: Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1502.06934
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)
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