Bayesian Mechanism Design
DOI10.1561/0400000045zbMATH Open1281.91089OpenAlexW4205759800MaRDI QIDQ5396759FDOQ5396759
Authors: Jason D. Hartline 
Publication date: 3 February 2014
Published in: Foundations and Trends® in Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1561/0400000045
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Optimal statistical designs (62K05) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to computer science (68-02) Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Approximation algorithms (68W25) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)
Cited In (19)
- Introduction to the special issue -- Algorithmic game theory -- STOC/FOCS/SODA 2011
- Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost
- On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions
- Matroid prophet inequalities and applications to multi-dimensional mechanism design
- Bayesian implementation: The necessity of infinite mechanisms
- An optimal bidimensional multi-armed bandit auction for multi-unit procurement
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical results
- Bayesian and weakly robust first best mechanisms: Characterizations
- Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
- Making the Most of Your Samples
- On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
- On a modification of the VCG mechanism and its optimality
- On submodular prophet inequalities and correlation gap
- Learning in Repeated Auctions
- On the planner's loss due to lack of information in Bayesian mechanism design
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Ex post Nash equilibrium in linear Bayesian games for decision making in multi-environments
- Pricing with Samples
- Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents
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