Matroid prophet inequalities and applications to multi-dimensional mechanism design
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1735736
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.11.002zbMath1419.91332MaRDI QIDQ1735736
S. Matthew Weinberg, Robert D. Kleinberg
Publication date: 29 March 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.11.002
stochastic optimization; online optimization; auction theory; revenue; multi-dimensional mechanism design
93E20: Optimal stochastic control
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
05B35: Combinatorial aspects of matroids and geometric lattices
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A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements, Introduction to the special issue -- Algorithmic Game Theory -- STOC/FOCS/SODA 2012, Prophet secretary through blind strategies
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