Matroid prophet inequalities and applications to multi-dimensional mechanism design

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.11.002zbMath1419.91332OpenAlexW2080956807MaRDI QIDQ1735736

S. Matthew Weinberg, Robert D. Kleinberg

Publication date: 29 March 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.11.002

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic optimizationonline optimizationauction theoryrevenuemulti-dimensional mechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Optimal stochastic control (93E20) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Combinatorial aspects of matroids and geometric lattices (05B35)

Related Items (6)

Prophet Matching with General Arrivals ⋮ Prophet inequality with competing agents ⋮ Secretary and online matching problems with machine learned advice ⋮ Introduction to the special issue -- Algorithmic Game Theory -- STOC/FOCS/SODA 2012 ⋮ Prophet secretary through blind strategies ⋮ A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements

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