Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions: Expanding Single Buyer Mechanisms to Many Buyers

DOI10.1109/FOCS.2011.90zbMath1292.91076MaRDI QIDQ5495029

Saeed Alaei

Publication date: 30 July 2014

Published in: 2011 IEEE 52nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (12)

Prophet Secretary ⋮ Approximation algorithms for stochastic combinatorial optimization problems ⋮ Polymatroid Prophet Inequalities ⋮ Prophet inequality with competing agents ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Revenue maximization in a Bayesian double auction market ⋮ Matroid prophet inequalities and applications to multi-dimensional mechanism design ⋮ Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing ⋮ Prior independent mechanisms via prophet inequalities with limited information ⋮ Extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing ⋮ Pricing Social Goods ⋮ The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design

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