Revenue maximization in a Bayesian double auction market
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Publication:2453118
DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2014.04.013zbMath1360.91093OpenAlexW3002565187MaRDI QIDQ2453118
Paul W. Goldberg, Bo Tang, Xiaotie Deng, Jinshan Zhang
Publication date: 6 June 2014
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2014.04.013
Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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