On optimal single-item auctions

DOI10.1145/1993636.1993654MaRDI QIDQ5419081zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors George Pierrakos, Christos Papadimitriou

Publication date 5 June 2014

Published in Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1145/1993636.1993654

zbMATH Keywords

correlated valuationsBayesian optimal mechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multi-objective and goal programming (90C29) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Marketing, advertising (90B60) Distribution theory (60E99)

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Cited in

(31)

• Lookahead auctions with pooling
• Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions
• Revenue maximization for market intermediation with correlated priors
• Simple, optimal and efficient auctions
• Revenue maximization with a single sample
• Tractable stochastic analysis in high dimensions via robust optimization
• Efficient empirical revenue maximization in single-parameter auction environments
• Optimal search auctions
• Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders
• Optimal deterministic auctions with correlated priors
• Optimal multi-unit combinatorial auctions
• Worst-case mechanism design via Bayesian analysis
• Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good
• Optimal design for multi-item auctions: a robust optimization approach
• Auction design with a revenue target
• A new derandomization of auctions
• Simple and nearly optimal multi-item auctions
• Efficient computation of optimal auctions via reduced forms
• Reverse auctions are different from auctions
• Bidder optimal assignments for general utilities
• Limitations of deterministic auction design for correlated bidders
• Derandomization of auctions
• Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions
• Generalized Permutahedra and Optimal Auctions
• Near-optimal online auctions
• Revenue maximization in a Bayesian double auction market
• An optimal auction for capacity constrained bidders: a network perspective
• A note on the continuity of the optimal auction
• Generalized second price auction is optimal for discrete types
• Near-optimal auctions on independence systems
• Alea iacta est: auctions, persuasion, interim rules, and dice

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