On optimal single-item auctions
DOI10.1145/1993636.1993654zbMATH Open1288.90087OpenAlexW1993197246MaRDI QIDQ5419081FDOQ5419081
Authors: George Pierrakos, Christos Papadimitriou 
Publication date: 5 June 2014
Published in: Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/1993636.1993654
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Multi-objective and goal programming (90C29) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Marketing, advertising (90B60) Distribution theory (60E99)
Cited In (31)
- Efficient empirical revenue maximization in single-parameter auction environments
- A new derandomization of auctions
- Simple and nearly optimal multi-item auctions
- Derandomization of auctions
- A note on the continuity of the optimal auction
- Simple, optimal and efficient auctions
- Tractable stochastic analysis in high dimensions via robust optimization
- Limitations of deterministic auction design for correlated bidders
- Revenue maximization in a Bayesian double auction market
- Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good
- Optimal design for multi-item auctions: a robust optimization approach
- Near-optimal online auctions
- Lookahead auctions with pooling
- Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions
- Revenue maximization for market intermediation with correlated priors
- Generalized Permutahedra and Optimal Auctions
- Alea iacta est: auctions, persuasion, interim rules, and dice
- Optimal multi-unit combinatorial auctions
- Auction design with a revenue target
- Near-optimal auctions on independence systems
- Generalized second price auction is optimal for discrete types
- Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions
- Revenue maximization with a single sample
- Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders
- Optimal deterministic auctions with correlated priors
- Bidder optimal assignments for general utilities
- Worst-case mechanism design via Bayesian analysis
- Efficient computation of optimal auctions via reduced forms
- Reverse auctions are different from auctions
- An optimal auction for capacity constrained bidders: a network perspective
- Optimal search auctions
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