On optimal single-item auctions

DOI10.1145/1993636.1993654zbMATH Open1288.90087OpenAlexW1993197246MaRDI QIDQ5419081FDOQ5419081

Authors: George Pierrakos, Christos Papadimitriou 

Publication date: 5 June 2014

Published in: Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/1993636.1993654

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zbMATH Keywords

correlated valuationsBayesian optimal mechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multi-objective and goal programming (90C29) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Marketing, advertising (90B60) Distribution theory (60E99)

Cited In (22)

• Efficient empirical revenue maximization in single-parameter auction environments
• A new derandomization of auctions
• Derandomization of auctions
• Simple, optimal and efficient auctions
• Tractable stochastic analysis in high dimensions via robust optimization
• Limitations of deterministic auction design for correlated bidders
• Revenue maximization in a Bayesian double auction market
• Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good
• Lookahead auctions with pooling
• Generalized Permutahedra and Optimal Auctions
• Worst-Case Mechanism Design via Bayesian Analysis
• Optimal multi-unit combinatorial auctions
• Revenue Maximization for Market Intermediation with Correlated Priors
• On the complexity of dynamic mechanism design
• Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions
• Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders
• Bidder optimal assignments for general utilities
• Reverse auctions are different from auctions
• An optimal auction for capacity constrained bidders: a network perspective
• Optimal search auctions
• Auction Design with a Revenue Target
• Optimal Design for Multi-Item Auctions: A Robust Optimization Approach

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