Optimal deterministic auctions with correlated priors
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Publication:2516251
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.009zbMath1318.91102arXiv1011.1279OpenAlexW2963874252MaRDI QIDQ2516251
George Pierrakos, Christos H. Papadimitriou
Publication date: 12 August 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1011.1279
Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Tight Revenue Gaps Among Simple Mechanisms ⋮ Introduction to the special issue -- Algorithmic game theory -- STOC/FOCS/SODA 2011
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