Competitive generalized auctions

DOI10.1145/509907.509921MaRDI QIDQ3579178zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Karlin, Amos Fiat

Publication date 5 August 2010

Published in Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1145/509907.509921

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited in

(14)

• Reducing mechanism design to algorithm design via machine learning
• Online learning in online auctions
• Derandomization of auctions
• Hardness results for multicast cost sharing.
• Competitive auctions
• Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing
• Explicitly simple near-tie auctions
• Optimal deterministic auctions with correlated priors
• Unconditional competitive auctions with copy and budget constraints
• Optimal impartial selection
• A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
• Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable
• The power of fair pricing mechanisms
• Setting lower bounds on truthfulness

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