Competitive auctions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2506308
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.02.003zbMath1125.91041OpenAlexW4247157595MaRDI QIDQ2506308
Publication date: 28 September 2006
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.02.003
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (42)
The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets ⋮ Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions ⋮ Optimal Impartial Selection ⋮ Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions ⋮ Characterization of Truthful Mechanisms for One-Dimensional Single Facility Location Game with Payments ⋮ Maxmin mechanism in a simple common value auction ⋮ Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents ⋮ Budget-balanced and strategy-proof auctions for ridesharing ⋮ Pricing commodities ⋮ Computer-Aided Verification for Mechanism Design ⋮ The power of fair pricing mechanisms ⋮ Prior-free multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders ⋮ Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions ⋮ Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions ⋮ Derandomization of auctions ⋮ Controlling the state of a motorway using express lanes ⋮ Making the Most of Your Samples ⋮ Optimal bundle pricing with monotonicity constraint ⋮ Reducing mechanism design to algorithm design via machine learning ⋮ Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs ⋮ Envy freedom and prior-free mechanism design ⋮ Online random sampling for budgeted settings ⋮ Robust game theory ⋮ Auctions for social lending: a theoretical analysis ⋮ Tractable stochastic analysis in high dimensions via robust optimization ⋮ When Analysis Fails: Heuristic Mechanism Design via Self-correcting Procedures ⋮ Optimal pricing of capacitated networks ⋮ Full surplus extraction from samples ⋮ Inequity aversion pricing over social networks: approximation algorithms and hardness results ⋮ Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects ⋮ Optimal VCG mechanisms to assign multiple bads ⋮ Prompt Mechanisms for Online Auctions ⋮ Robust Auctions for Revenue via Enhanced Competition ⋮ Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals ⋮ Worst-Case Mechanism Design via Bayesian Analysis ⋮ Multi-unit auctions with budget limits ⋮ Optimal digital product auctions with unlimited supply and rebidding behavior ⋮ Truthful Generalized Assignments via Stable Matching ⋮ Optimal Design for Multi-Item Auctions: A Robust Optimization Approach ⋮ Hats, auctions and derandomization ⋮ Revenue maximization with a single sample ⋮ Analyses of cardinal auctions
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Reducing mechanism design to algorithm design via machine learning
- Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions
- Competitive generalized auctions
- Revenue maximization when bidders have budgets
- Knapsack auctions
- Optimal Auction Design
- Derandomization of auctions
- Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency
This page was built for publication: Competitive auctions
