When Analysis Fails: Heuristic Mechanism Design via Self-correcting Procedures

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-95891-8_9MaRDI QIDQ3599064zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David C. Parkes

Publication date 3 February 2009

Published in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3160486

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problem solving in the context of artificial intelligence (heuristics, search strategies, etc.) (68T20) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• Algorithmic Game Theory
• Algorithmic mechanism design
• Automated design of revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions
• Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions
• Competitive auctions
• Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities
• Dynamic Mechanism Design for Online Commerce
• Incentives in Teams
• Integration of AI and OR Techniques in Constraint Programming for Combinatorial Optimization Problems
• Optimal dynamic auctions and simple index rules
• Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions

Cited in

(1)

• A framework for the analysis of self-confirming policies

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