When Analysis Fails: Heuristic Mechanism Design via Self-correcting Procedures

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-95891-8_9zbMath1206.68312OpenAlexW1838485156MaRDI QIDQ3599064

David C. Parkes

Publication date: 3 February 2009

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3160486

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Problem solving in the context of artificial intelligence (heuristics, search strategies, etc.) (68T20) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)

Cites Work

• Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities
• Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions
• Competitive auctions
• Automated Design of Revenue-Maximizing Combinatorial Auctions
• Dynamic Mechanism Design for Online Commerce
• Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
• Incentives in Teams
• Optimal Dynamic Auctions and Simple Index Rules
• Algorithmic Game Theory
• Integration of AI and OR Techniques in Constraint Programming for Combinatorial Optimization Problems
• Algorithmic mechanism design

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