Algorithmic mechanism design

DOI10.1006/game.1999.0790zbMath0996.68251OpenAlexW2012634103WikidataQ55899415 ScholiaQ55899415MaRDI QIDQ5938624

Publication date: 2001

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.16.7473

zbMATH Keywords

scheduling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Distributed systems (68M14) Approximation algorithms (68W25) Distributed algorithms (68W15)

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