Auction protocols for decentralized scheduling

DOI10.1006/game.2000.0822zbMath0996.90047OpenAlexW2131801993WikidataQ62636522 ScholiaQ62636522MaRDI QIDQ5938627

Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, Michael P. Wellman, William E. Walsh, Peter R. Wurman

Publication date: 30 July 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/480493524667782dd8c24c349a462adbe2bb0afd

zbMATH Keywords

auction protocolautonomous agentsdecentralized schedulingexistence of equilibrium pricesquality of equilibrium solutions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Performance evaluation, queueing, and scheduling in the context of computer systems (68M20) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (27)

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Cites Work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
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• Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
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• The assignment game. I: The core
• Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
• A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions
• Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Incentives in Teams
• A parametrization of the auction design space
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