The assignment game. I: The core

DOI10.1007/BF01753437zbMATH Open0236.90078WikidataQ57442293 ScholiaQ57442293MaRDI QIDQ2552452FDOQ2552452

Authors: Lloyd S. Shapley, Martin Shubik 

Publication date: 1971

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

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• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
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• Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences
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• Indivisibilites dans une Economie d'Echanges
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Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)

• My encounters with David Gale
• Pairwise solutions and the core of transportation situations
• A procedure to compute the nucleolus of the assignment game
• Another proof that assignment games have singleton cores only if multiple optimal matchings exist
• A characterization of strongly stable fractional matchings
• A general two-sided matching market with discrete concave utility functions
• QUASI-ASSIGNMENT COOPERATIVE GAMES
• Auctions versus private negotiations in buyer-seller networks
• Computing the least-core and nucleolus for threshold cardinality matching games
• Comparative statics of assignment markets with general utilities
• LINEAR AND INTEGER PROGRAMMING TECHNIQUES FOR COOPERATIVE GAMES
• Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study
• Restricted housewapping games
• Convergence of the Core in Assignment Markets
• Cooperative assignment games with the inverse Monge property
• Paths to stability in the assignment problem
• Social exchange networks with distant bargaining
• An assignment model with local constraints: competitive equilibrium and ascending auction
• Networks, frictions, and price dispersion
• Stable bargained equilibria for assignment games without side payments
• Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions
• Spatio-Temporal Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms
• Some further remark on the core structure of the assignment game.
• On stability of collaborative supplier selection
• Bargaining dynamics in exchange networks
• Consistency, weak fairness, and the Shapley value
• A survey on assignment markets
• Endogenous budget constraints in the assignment game
• On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory
• Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor
• Core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market
• A glove-market partitioned matrix related to the assignment game
• Shapley's conjecture on the cores of abstract market games
• Matching structure and bargaining outcomes in buyer-seller networks
• Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
• Weakening transferable utility: the case of non-intersecting Pareto curves
• Transportation interval situations and related games
• Existence of an equilibrium in a competitive economy with indivisibilities and money
• Matching markets with middlemen under transferable utility
• Approximately fair cost allocation in metric traveling salesman games
• Substitution, Complementarity, and Stability
• The 'marriage game': An assignment problem with indivisibilities
• Approximate cores of replica games and economies. I: Replica games, externalities, and approximate cores
• On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
• On the structure of cooperative and competitive solutions for a generalized assignment game
• Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
• A polynomial-time algorithm for a stable matching problem with linear valuations and bounded side payments
• Stable sharing
• A competitive market model for indivisible commodities.
• Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium
• Core theory for multiple-sided assignment games
• Strategic behavior and partial cost sharing.
• Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing
• Simultaneous independent online auctions with discrete bid increments
• Bargaining sets and the core in partitioning games
• On the core of transportation games
• Identification of efficient equilibria in multiproduct trading with indivisibilities and non-monotonicity
• Strongly balanced cooperative games
• Applications of discrete convex analysis to mathematical economics
• The core of an \(m\)-sided assignment game
• Competitive equilibrium with search frictions: a general equilibrium approach
• Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities
• RANKING AUCTIONS: A COOPERATIVE APPROACH
• The Shapley value of exact assignment games
• An algorithm for identifying fair and optimal allocations
• Profit-maximizing matchmaker
• Optimal coalition formation and surplus distribution: two sides of one coin
• Assignment markets that are uniquely determined by their core
• Coalitional games: monotonicity and core
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions in the assignment market
• Multi-item Vickrey-English-Dutch auctions
• Introduction to computer science and economic theory
• Endogenous matching in a market with heterogeneous principals and agents
• Comparative statics in markets for indivisible goods
• Cooperative location games based on the minimum diameter spanning Steiner subgraph problem
• Nash equilibria in a model of multiproduct price competition: an assignment problem
• Characterization of cores of assignment games
• Quasi stable outcomes in the assignment game
• Two-sided micro-matching with technical progress
• The pairwise egalitarian solution for the assignment game
• Cores of partitioning games
• Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market
• Optimal provision-after-wait in healthcare
• Buyer-seller exactness in the assignment game
• Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium
• Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
• Subordinated hedonic games
• Indivisible commodities and an equivalence theorem on the strong core
• On a dynamic auction mechanism for a bilateral assignment problem
• The pairwise egalitarian solution.
• A graph theoretic approach to markets for indivisible goods
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria
• Entropy methods for identifying hedonic models
• A unifying model for matrix-based pairing situations
• Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market
• A generalized assignment game
• The central assignment game and the assignment markets
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for balancedness in partitioning games
• Assignment markets with the same core

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