The assignment game. I: The core
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2552452
DOI10.1007/BF01753437zbMATH Open0236.90078WikidataQ57442293 ScholiaQ57442293MaRDI QIDQ2552452FDOQ2552452
Authors: Lloyd S. Shapley, Martin Shubik 
Publication date: 1971
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Indivisibilites dans une Economie d'Echanges
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)
- Spatio-temporal pricing for ridesharing platforms
- Rationing, bargaining, and voting in 2-sided markets
- My encounters with David Gale
- Pairwise solutions and the core of transportation situations
- A procedure to compute the nucleolus of the assignment game
- Another proof that assignment games have singleton cores only if multiple optimal matchings exist
- A characterization of strongly stable fractional matchings
- Efficient spatial competition
- The nucleolus and the core-center of multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets
- QUASI-ASSIGNMENT COOPERATIVE GAMES
- Auctions versus private negotiations in buyer-seller networks
- Computing the least-core and nucleolus for threshold cardinality matching games
- Comparative statics of assignment markets with general utilities
- Local stability constraints
- LINEAR AND INTEGER PROGRAMMING TECHNIQUES FOR COOPERATIVE GAMES
- Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study
- Restricted housewapping games
- Convergence of the Core in Assignment Markets
- Cooperative assignment games with the inverse Monge property
- Paths to stability in the assignment problem
- Social exchange networks with distant bargaining
- Substitution, complementarity, and stability
- An assignment model with local constraints: competitive equilibrium and ascending auction
- Networks, frictions, and price dispersion
- Stable bargained equilibria for assignment games without side payments
- Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions
- Some further remark on the core structure of the assignment game.
- On stability of collaborative supplier selection
- Bargaining dynamics in exchange networks
- Consistency, weak fairness, and the Shapley value
- A survey on assignment markets
- Endogenous budget constraints in the assignment game
- On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory
- Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor
- Core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market
- A glove-market partitioned matrix related to the assignment game
- Shapley's conjecture on the cores of abstract market games
- Matching structure and bargaining outcomes in buyer-seller networks
- Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
- Weakening transferable utility: the case of non-intersecting Pareto curves
- Transportation interval situations and related games
- Existence of an equilibrium in a competitive economy with indivisibilities and money
- The 'marriage game': An assignment problem with indivisibilities
- Approximate cores of replica games and economies. I: Replica games, externalities, and approximate cores
- On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
- On the structure of cooperative and competitive solutions for a generalized assignment game
- Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
- A competitive market model for indivisible commodities.
- Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium
- Core theory for multiple-sided assignment games
- Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing
- Simultaneous independent online auctions with discrete bid increments
- Bargaining sets and the core in partitioning games
- On the core of transportation games
- On games arising from multi-depot Chinese postman problems
- On revenue maximization with sharp multi-unit demands
- Cooperation in one machine scheduling
- Stable sets in one-seller assignment games
- Envy-free pricing in multi-item markets
- Hedonic price equilibria, stable matching, and optimal transport: Equivalence, topology, and uniqueness
- The stability of hedonic coalition structures
- On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability
- Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions
- Perfect competition in the continuous assignment model
- On the core of network synthesis games
- An algorithm for finding the nucleolus of assignment games
- How to efficiently allocate houses under price controls?
- Trading networks with price-setting agents
- Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities
- Existence, uniqueness and efficiency of equilibrium in hedonic markets with multidimensional types
- Inventory games.
- Comparative statics in matching markets
- On the revealed preference analysis of stable aggregate matchings
- Median stable matching for markets with wages
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Collaboration in Cargo Transportation
- The nonatomic assignment model
- Comments on: ``Remarkable polyhedra related to set functions, games and capacities
- The kernel is in the least core for permutation games
- On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching
- Random decentralized market processes for stable job matchings with competitive salaries
- Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a market design approach
- Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
- Conditional distributions, exchangeable particle systems, and stochastic partial differential equations
- Characterization of the Owen set of linear production processes
- Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility
- Efficient market-clearing prices in markets with nonconvexities
- The reactive bargaining set for cooperative games
- Stochastic linear programming games with concave preferences
- Efficient and non-deteriorating choice.
- Batch sequencing and cooperation
- On cores and indivisibility
- Computing the nucleolus of cyclic permutation games
- Sequencing situations with just-in-time arrival, and related games
- Permutation games: Another class of totally balanced games
- Price controls, non-price quality competition, and the nonexistence of competitive equilibrium
- Modeling cooperative decision situations: the deviation function form and the equilibrium concept
- Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money
- Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions
- Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game
This page was built for publication: The assignment game. I: The core
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2552452)
