A survey on assignment markets

DOI10.3934/jdg.2015003zbMath1391.91020OpenAlexW2527083522WikidataQ59973546 ScholiaQ59973546MaRDI QIDQ908179

Carles Rafels, Marina Núñez

Publication date: 3 February 2016

Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2015003

zbMATH Keywords

corecompetitive equilibriumauctioncoalitional gameassignment game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (9)

Market sentiments and convergence dynamics in decentralized assignment economies ⋮ Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem ⋮ Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems ⋮ The minimum set of \(\mu\)-compatible subgames for obtaining a stable set in an assignment game ⋮ Sensitivity of fair prices in assignment markets ⋮ Solving Becker's assortative assignments and extensions ⋮ Does it make sense to analyse a two-sided market as a multi-choice game? ⋮ A note on assignment games with the same nucleolus ⋮ Stable cost sharing in production allocation games

Cites Work

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