The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria

DOI10.1007/S00186-012-0395-4MaRDI QIDQ1935950zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme, Daniel A. Jaume

Publication date 20 February 2013

Published in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-012-0395-4

zbMATH Keywords

assignment gamecompetitive equilibriumindivisible goodslatticematching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Review text

The authors study competitive equilibria of markets with indivisible goods. The existence of this equilibrium is proved by means linear programming only. They show how to compute the equilibrium price vector. All theorems are carefully proved.

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Cites work

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• Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game
• Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4089320 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited in

(20)

• A simple selling and buying procedure
• Identification of efficient equilibria in multiproduct trading with indivisibilities and non-monotonicity
• On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
• Comparative statics in the multiple-partners assignment game
• Core and pricing equilibria in combinatorial exchanges
• An assignment model with local constraints: competitive equilibrium and ascending auction
• On the structure of cooperative and competitive solutions for a generalized assignment game
• Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game
• The structure of competitive equilibria in an assignment market
• A graph theoretic approach to markets for indivisible goods
• Nash equilibria in a model of multiproduct price competition: an assignment problem
• On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria
• Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
• One-seller assignment markets with multi-unit demands: core and competitive equilibrium
• Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game
• Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
• Equilibrium in a two-agent assignment problem
• Existence, uniqueness and efficiency of equilibrium in hedonic markets with multidimensional types
• Endogenous budget constraints in the assignment game
• A survey on assignment markets

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