Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game
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Publication:2373771
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.005zbMath1157.91411MaRDI QIDQ2373771
Publication date: 16 July 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.005
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