Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2006.02.005zbMATH Open1157.91411OpenAlexW2154862224MaRDI QIDQ2373771FDOQ2373771

Authors: Marilda Sotomayor 

Publication date: 16 July 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.005

Recommendations

• On the structure of cooperative and competitive solutions for a generalized assignment game
• Comparative statics in the multiple-partners assignment game
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• The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game

zbMATH Keywords

latticematchingcompetitive equilibriumcoresetwise-stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Trade models (91B60) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
• A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
• Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
• Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game
• Stable matching in a common generalization of the marriage and assignment models
• The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game
• The English auction with differentiated commodities
• Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market
• The central assignment game and the assignment markets
• Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
• A labor market with heterogeneous firms and workers
• A simple selling and buying procedure
• Subsolutions and the Supercore of Cooperative Games
• Some further remark on the core structure of the assignment game.
• An extension and simple proof of a constrained lattice fixed point theorem
• A lattice fixed-point theorem with constraints
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (25)

• Axioms for the optimal stable rules and fair-division rules in a multiple-partners job market
• Market power in bilateral oligopoly markets with non-expandable infrastructures
• Stable cost sharing in production allocation games
• A note on the multiple partners assignment game
• Competition and cooperation in a two-sided matching market with replication
• The equilibrium-value convergence for the multiple-partners game
• Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
• Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems
• Two-Sided Matching Models
• The stable fixtures problem with payments
• A Large Population Partnership Formation Game with Associative Preferences and Continuous Time
• Modeling cooperative decision situations: the deviation function form and the equilibrium concept
• On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria
• Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game
• Stability property of matchings is a natural solution concept in coalitional market games
• Comparative statics in the multiple-partners assignment game
• Some advances in cooperative game theory: indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach
• A generalized assignment game
• A survey on assignment markets
• On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory
• The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer-seller markets when the agents play strategically
• On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
• On the structure of cooperative and competitive solutions for a generalized assignment game
• The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria
• Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions

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