On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory

DOI10.3934/jdg.2015001zbMath1360.91005OpenAlexW2524838743WikidataQ59973540 ScholiaQ59973540MaRDI QIDQ908176

Danilo Coelho, David Pérez-Castrillo

Publication date: 3 February 2016

Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2015001

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamesmatchingcoremechanismoptimal stable outcome

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Biographies, obituaries, personalia, bibliographies (01A70) History of game theory, economics, and finance (91-03) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game
• On income fluctuations and capital gains
• Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market
• Core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• A further note on the stable matching problem
• Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
• Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
• Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
• Some further remark on the core structure of the assignment game.
• Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
• A simple selling and buying procedure
• On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
• A nonconstructive elementary proof of the existence of stable marriages
• The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game
• Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market
• Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game
• My encounters with David Gale
• The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
• The College Admissions Problem Revisited
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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