Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
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Publication:1420524
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00047-2zbMath1069.91084OpenAlexW2025422974MaRDI QIDQ1420524
Publication date: 2 February 2004
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00047-2
Related Items (22)
Decentralized college admissions under single application ⋮ Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core ⋮ On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ Constitutions and groups ⋮ Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory ⋮ Finding all stable matchings with couples ⋮ The Pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences ⋮ A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem' ⋮ Subjective homophily and the fixtures problem ⋮ Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences ⋮ A further note on the college admission game ⋮ Two-Sided Matching Models ⋮ Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching ⋮ The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings ⋮ Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market ⋮ Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration ⋮ Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability ⋮ Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab ⋮ Monge Properties, Optimal Greedy Policies, and Policy Improvement for the Dynamic Stochastic Transportation Problem ⋮ Implementation of the Core in College Admissions Problems When Colleagues Matter
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