Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00047-2zbMath1069.91084MaRDI QIDQ1420524

Marilda Sotomayor

Publication date: 2 February 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00047-2

zbMATH Keywords

Core; Pairwise-stable matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B68: Matching models

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