A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
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Publication:462856
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2014.09.003zbMATH Open1308.91121OpenAlexW1503583806MaRDI QIDQ462856FDOQ462856
Authors: Flip Klijn, Ayşe Yazıcı 
Publication date: 22 October 2014
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://dro.dur.ac.uk/13457/1/13457.pdf
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Cites Work
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Cited In (12)
- Lone wolves in competitive equilibria
- Strong core and Pareto-optimality in the multiple partners matching problem under lexicographic preference domains
- On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets
- Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences
- Lone wolves in infinite, discrete matching markets
- Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility
- Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
- Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach
- Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching
- Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
- The ``rural hospital theorem revisited
- Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
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