Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences
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Publication:2425160
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.03.005zbMath1417.91380OpenAlexW2931039211WikidataQ128093367 ScholiaQ128093367MaRDI QIDQ2425160
Publication date: 26 June 2019
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.03.005
Related Items (3)
Pareto efficient matchings with pairwise preferences ⋮ Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach ⋮ Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand
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