Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences
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Publication:2425160
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2019.03.005zbMATH Open1417.91380OpenAlexW2931039211WikidataQ128093367 ScholiaQ128093367MaRDI QIDQ2425160FDOQ2425160
Publication date: 26 June 2019
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.03.005
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Cited In (5)
- Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities
- Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand
- Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach
- Pareto efficient matchings with pairwise preferences
- Stability, optimality and manipulation in matching problems with weighted preferences
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