Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2019.03.005MaRDI QIDQ2425160zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Ning Chen, Mengling Li

Publication date 26 June 2019

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.03.005

zbMATH Keywords

many-to-many matchingPareto stabilityweak preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Matching models (91B68)

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Cited in

(15)

• The difference between the weak core and the strong core from the design point of view
• Strong core and Pareto-optimality in the multiple partners matching problem under lexicographic preference domains
• Two-sided matching with indifferences
• Transfers and exchange-stability in two-sided matching problems
• Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities
• The stability of many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
• Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand
• Generalized matchings for preferences represented by simplest semiorder: stability and Pareto optimality
• Pareto stable matchings under one-sided matroid constraints
• The Pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences
• Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
• Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach
• Pareto efficient matchings with pairwise preferences
• A new approach to the Pareto stable matching problem
• Stability, optimality and manipulation in matching problems with weighted preferences

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