A new approach to the Pareto stable matching problem
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Cites work
- A Faster Strongly Polynomial Minimum Cost Flow Algorithm
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Combinatorial optimization. Polyhedra and efficiency (3 volumes)
- Efficient Algorithms for Weighted Rank-Maximal Matchings and Related Problems
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45086 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1405659 (Why is no real title available?)
- On computing Pareto stable assignments
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- Rank-maximal matchings
- Reducing rank-maximal to maximum weight matching
- Stable marriage and indifference
- The Pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences
- Two-sided matching with indifferences
Cited in
(10)- Two-sided matching with indifferences
- Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences
- Pareto efficient matchings with pairwise preferences
- On computing Pareto stable assignments
- Pareto stable matchings under one-sided matroid constraints
- Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
- The Pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences
- On a many-sided matching problem with mixed preferences
- Group strategyproof Pareto-stable marriage with indifferences via the generalized assignment game
- Generalized matchings for preferences represented by simplest semiorder: stability and Pareto optimality
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