On computing Pareto stable assignments
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Cited in
(18)- Matching with ownership
- Essentially stable matchings
- Pareto optimality in many-to-many matching problems
- Two-sided matching with indifferences
- Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences
- Pareto optimality in coalition formation
- Pareto efficient matchings with pairwise preferences
- Pareto optimal matchings in many-to-many markets with ties
- Pareto optimal matchings in many-to-many markets with ties
- Weighted matching markets with budget constraints
- Pareto stable matchings under one-sided matroid constraints
- A new approach to the Pareto stable matching problem
- Stable sharing
- The Pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences
- Group strategyproof Pareto-stable marriage with indifferences via the generalized assignment game
- Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions
- On the convergence of swap dynamics to Pareto-optimal matchings
- Generalized matchings for preferences represented by simplest semiorder: stability and Pareto optimality
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