Essentially stable matchings
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Cites work
- (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice
- A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea
- A polynomial-time algorithm to find von Neumann-Morgenstern stable matchings in marriage games
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem
- An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
- Axioms for deferred acceptance
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Fair student placement
- Farsightedly stable networks
- House allocation with existing tenants
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- Making just school assignments
- Networks and farsighted stability
- Obvious manipulations
- On cores and indivisibility
- Rational expectations and farsighted stability
- School choice under partial fairness
- School Choice with Consent*
- Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- The Complexity of Counting Stable Marriages
- The farsighted stable set
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
Cited in
(37)- On stable matchings and flows
- Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas
- Stable matchings with couples
- Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities
- Quantile stable mechanisms
- Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice
- Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab
- Matching with ownership
- Matching through institutions
- Jointly stable matchings
- Stability against robust deviations in the roommate problem
- Robust stability in matching markets
- Stable matchings of teachers to schools
- Approximate efficiency in matching markets
- On Compatible Matchings
- Axiomatic characterizations of the constrained probabilistic serial mechanism
- When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?
- Non-vetoed matching with status quo
- CATCHMENT AREAS, STRATIFICATION, AND ACCESS TO BETTER SCHOOLS
- School choice with transferable student characteristics
- Weak stability against robust deviations and the bargaining set in the roommate problem
- Unique stable matchings
- A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
- The core of school choice problems
- Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent
- (Non-)obvious manipulability of rank-minimizing mechanisms
- Group robust stability in matching markets
- Stability vs. no justified envy
- Justified-envy-minimal efficient mechanisms for priority-based matching
- Improving the deferred acceptance with minimal compromise
- The properness of weak stability notions
- Obvious manipulations in matching with and without contracts
- Widening access in university admissions
- Characterizing priorities for deferred acceptance with or without outside options
- Existence of myopic-farsighted stable sets in matching markets
- A note on obvious manipulations of quantile stable mechanisms
- Characterization of super-stable matchings
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