Characterizing priorities for deferred acceptance with or without outside options

DOI10.1007/S00199-024-01586-5MaRDI QIDQ7013820zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Xiang Han, Junxiao Zhang

Publication date 12 March 2025

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00199-024-01586-5

zbMATH Keywords

acyclicitydeferred acceptance algorithmefficiencygroup strategy-proofnessoutside optionpriority-based allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites work

• (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Constrained school choice
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• Essentially stable matchings
• Fair student placement
• Group robust stability in matching markets
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
• On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
• Robust stability in matching markets
• School choice under partial fairness
• Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• The core of school choice problems
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice
• When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?

Cited in

(4)

• Compatibility between stability and strategy-proofness: a single-peaked preferences investigation
• Sequential dictatorship rules in multi-unit object assignment problems with money
• Asylum assignment and burden-sharing
• Coalitional manipulability in school choice

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